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UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE:
THE DEFINITION OF EMPLOYEE
HARRY ZANKEL *
A N IMPORTANT issue to those who engage labor is
whether the persons who render the services are
deemed employees or independent contractors. The con-
sequence of a finding of employee status is the employer's
liability to contribute to an unemployment insurance fund.
The tests presently used in the various states to deter-
mine whether a person is an employee or independent
contractor are well known. These tests may be described
as follows:
1. The control test prescribed by the common-law
definition of master and servant.
2. The "ABC" tests.
3. The common-law tests in combination with the
statutory "ABC" tests.
4. The control test "realistically" applied by the fed-
eral courts.
It is the purpose of this paper to examine the various
tests used to determine employee status and to evaluate
the benefits and the problems resulting from New York's
use of the common-law definition of master and servant.
The Comrmon-law Test in New York
The New York Unemployment Insurance Law' never
contained the "ABC" tests or other guidelines for the
administrative determination of who is an employee. The
* Counsel, New York Division of Employment; LL.B., 1936, Brooklyn
Law School; Member of the New York Bar.
' N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 560-63.
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criteria have been established principally through judicial
review of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board deci-
sions and by cases dealing with other statutes.
When Judge Cardozo sat on the New York Court of
Appeals, he attempted to define the master-servant relation-
ship in terms of an engagement to obey:
On the one side there is an intimacy of control and on the other
a fullness of submission that imports the presence of a 'sovereign,'
as the master, we are reminded, was sometimes called in the old
books.2
The application of Cardozo's definition proved to be as
troublesome as the attempts to apply the countless defini-
tions which his predecessors had enunciated. Many deci-
sions quoted a lower court's feeling of frustration: "There
is no neat device by which a person may be catalogued as
an employee or an independent contractor." '
The Court of Appeals thereafter once more essayed a
general definition in Matter of Morton.' Since then most
full-dress decisions dealing with the employee-independent
contractor question set forth this language from the Morton
case:
What then is the test of this distinction between a servant and
an independent contractor? The test is the existence of the right
of control over the agent in respect of the manner in which his
work is to be done. A servant is an agent who works under the
supervision and direction of his employer; an independent con-
tractor is one who is his own master. A servant is a person
engaged to obey his employer's orders from time to time; an
independent contractor is a person engaged to do certain work,
but to exercise his own discretion as to the mode and time of
doing it-he is bound by his contract but not by his employer's
orders .....
From the nature of the problem the degree of control which must
be reserved by an employer in order to create the employer-
employee relationship, cannot be stated in terms of mathematical
precision and various aspects of the relationship may be considered
2 Glielmi v. Netherland Dairy Co., 254 N.Y. 60, 63, 171 N.E. 906, 907
(1930).
3 Matter of Inter City Associates, 284 App. Div. 673, 675, 134 N.Y.S.2d
427, 429 (3d Dep't 1954).
4284 N.Y. 167, 30 N.E.2d 369 (1940).
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in arriving at the conclusion in a particular case. Therefore we
must examine the facts in the case at bar to determine whether the
arrangement between claimant and respondent was so altogether
lacking in those marks which ordinarily characterize the relation-
ship of employer and employee, that claimant must be deemed, as
a matter of law, to have been an independent contractor .... 5
Under the common law, the actual exercise of direction
and control is not required where the employer by virtue
of contract, has the right of direction and control.
The "ABC" Tests
A discussion of this subject requires brief reference to
the "ABC" tests which are contained in many state stat-
utes. Such statutes have been used only in the unemploy-
ment insurance program.'
The Committee on Legal Affairs of the Interstate Con-
ference in 1936 concluded that the term "employee" should
not be limited by the technical legal relationship of
master and servant. The Committee recommended that
the several states adopt the "ABC" tests patterned on the
Wisconsin statute. The Social Security Board drafted a
model statute which contained the "ABC" tests. The drafts-
men of the model statute felt that unemployment insurance
coverage should be extended to persons not engaged in an
independently established business of their own who per-
form services for others.
The "ABC" tests originally adopted by most of the
states took the following form:
Employment .. . means service . . . performed for wages or under
any contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied. ...
Services performed by an individual for wages shall be deemed
to be employment subject to this act unless and until it is shown
to the satisfaction of commissioner that-
(a) such individual has been and will continue to be free from
control or direction over the performance of such service,
both under his contract of service and in fact; and
DId. at 172-73, 30 N.E.2d at 371.6 See B. AARoN, THE EmPLOYMENT RELATION AND THE LAW 46-48
(1957).
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(b) such service is either outside the usual course of the busi-
ness for which such service is performed or that such
service is performed outside of all the places of business
of the enterprise for which such service is performed;
and
(c) such individual is customarily engaged in an independent-
ly established trade, occupation, profession or business.7
In some jurisdictions the courts superimposed the con-
trol test contained in the common-law definition of master
and servant upon the "ABC" tests. These courts failed to
give full application to the "ABC" tests and held that
such tests did not extend coverage beyond that afforded
by common law.
The Common-law Test .Realistically Applied
The Supreme Court of the United States attempted
by "judicial legislation" to broaden the common-law def-
inition of master and servant and sought to mandate by
judge-made law what the "ABC" tests were designed to
accomplish. The Court rejected the common-law standards
and defined the term "employee" as used in social insur-
ance statutes so that the protection afforded by such laws
would be broadened. It evolved the theory of economic
reality and pointed to some of the obvious defects of the
doctrine of respondeat superior.
In United States v. Silk,8 the Court held that the
common-law test of master and servant was not the sole
factor to be considered where social legislation was in-
volved. The Court held that the term "employee" used in
this type of statute should include all those not engaged
in their own enterprises who as a matter of economic
reality perform services for, and are dependent for their
livelihood on the employer for whom their services are
rendered.
7 Draft Bills for State Unemployment Compensation of Pooled Funds
and Employer Account Types, prepared by Social Security Board, Revised
Edition, Jan., 1967.
3331 U.S. 704 (1947).
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The Court's decisions in the Sitlk and Bartels v,. Birm-
ingha m9 cases contained broad language which could have
created anomalous situations. Many persons felt that leg-
islation was necessary to curtail their effect."0 Congress-
man Gearhart described this feeling as follows:
However, there crept into these decisions a little of what lawyers
call obiter dicta; that is, some words which were quite unnecessary
to the result. These words were to the effect that for purposes
of social security, the Social Security Administration was not
necessarily bound in extending the social-security coverage by the
ancient common-law definition of master and servant, or employer
and employee, as you may choose to call it, but that they could
take into the system as employees any persons who were depend-
ent upon a business in the light of economic realities, thereby
throwing into the entire system a confusion which required
immediate legislative attention."
After the Court evolved its economic reality doctrine in the
Silk case, Congress hastened to adopt the Gearhart Resolu-
tion ' which in effect provided that the term "employee"
as used in the Social Security Law and the Federal Uinem-
ployment Insurance Tax Act should be defined in accord-
ance with the common-law definition of master and servant.
The federal courts, after some vacillation, appear to
have come to the conclusion that it was the intent of
Congress that the existence or absence of an employment
relationship is to be ascertained not by the use of the
economic reality test but rather by the realistic application
of common-law rules. 3 These decisions rely upon congres-
sional intent as expressed by the minutes of the congres-
sional committees which were responsible for the drafting
of the Gearhart Resolution.
The Internal Revenue Service, however, has refused to
acquiesce in any decision which it believes to be in conflict
9 332 U.S. 126 (1947).
10 See Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126 (1947); United States v.
Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947).
23 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 94 CoNG. REc. 8189 (1948).
12Act of June 14, 1948, ch. 468, § 2(a), 62 Stat. 438.
18United States v. Crawford Pacldng Co., 330 F.2d 194, 195 (5th Cir.
1964); United States v. Thorson, 282 F.2d 157, 159 (lst Cir. 1960).
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with the Silk case. In a recent announcement that it
would not follow a decision holding unloaders to be inde-
pendent contractors,"4 it reiterated that it would continue
to rely upon a "realistic" approach to the problem.
Economic reality is evidently a persuasive factor in the
decisions on this subject, even where the courts may not
allude to the doctrine, and the decisions are ostensibly
predicated on common-law factors. In weighing the effect
of the various factors in a given case, economic reality
plays a subtle but decisive part. Even in New York, where
the courts have consistently and zealously adhered to the
common-law rule of master and servant, economic reality
appears to be a persuasive factor. For example, in Matter
of Electrolux,' the Court appeared to have been persuaded
by the fact that the employer's business depended solely
upon the sales efforts of commission salesmen, and that
under such circumstances reality would not permit the
employer to refrain from exercising control over its repre-
sentatives. The Court stated:
In weighing this evidence one basic consideration is the sales
methods used by respondent in marketing its product. Respondent
does not rely upon national advertising in order to create a market
nor depend upon the ordinary retail outlets to distribute its prod-
uct. It depends entirely upon the canvassing conducted by its
representatives, both to publicize and to sell the vacuum cleaners
it manufactures. Consequently it is a little difficult to believe the
protestations of respondent that it has not the slightest interest,
or wish to interfere, in the selling activities of its representatives.
With this consideration in mind we proceed to an examination of
the evidence in these cases solely to see if there is sufficient con-
tained therein to support the findings of the Appeal Board, includ-
ing the finding that respondent's practices are not in accord with
the terms of its sales representatives' agreements.""
Similarly, in Matter of Daugherty," the reality prin-
ciple was a controlling factor. The factual situation pre-
24 Bonney Motor Express Inc. v. United States, 206 F. Supp. 22 (E.D.
Va. 1962).
25288 N.Y. 440, 43 N.E.2d 480 (1942).
26Id. at 444, 43 N.E.2d at 482.
.724 App. Div. 2d 919, 264 N.Y.S.2d 684 (3d Dep't 1965).
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sented was whether "hot walkers," who, for a flat sum,
cooled off race horses which had been heavily exercised,
were employees or independent contractors. The court,
moved by the realities of the situation, pointed out that:
[I]t seems hardly likely, however, that a horse trainer charged
with the responsibility of conditioning valuable thoroughbreds for
large purse racing would relinquish, without variation or excep-
tion, his right to exercise control over itinerant stable hands
engaged in the performance of work which seems to have been
regarded as an important feature of the training program. More-
over, the simple character of the work performed as generally
viewed would be more consistent with the existence of a master
and servant relationship than that of independent contractorship.1
Administrative and Legal Difficulties Presented by the
Common-law Test
The uncertainties of the common-law test present dif-
ficulties to claimants, to administrative agencies, and especial-
ly to employers. Successful operation of a business requires
that an employer be reasonably certain as to tax liability
so that provision may be made to meet the resultant obli-
gation. An employer can, of course, obtain an advisory
determination from a state unemployment compensation
agency. However, in New York such determination affords
little protection, for if the determination is eventually set
aside in a benefit claim proceeding, the employer is not
relieved of the obligation to pay contributions. If he has
made a full and fair disclosure of all of the facts, the sole
effect of the advisory determination is the avoidance of
penalties.
In doubtful employee status cases, the agency is re-
quired under the common-law rule to make a searching
and painstaking investigation of all the facts and circum-
stances of the relationship. Investigations of this nature
are time-consuming and expensive. Determinations or rul-
ings made without the benefit of investigation rest upon
weak foundations and may not stand the test of adminis-
isId. at 920, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
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trative review or judicial scrutiny. These investigations
are irksome to employers, expensive to the administrative
agency and they delay payments to the benefit claimant.
An unemployed benefit claimant can hardly be expected to
comprehend the legal niceties of the common-law definition
of master and servant or to understand the time lag which
must ensue in order to ascertain the facts which must be
fed to the legal gristmill before his claim can be disposed
of.
Inconsistent adjudications often result from inadequate
investigations rather than judicial error. One often won-
ders whether apparently conflicting decisions in the same
or other jurisdictions are a result of the difficulty of
assembling and presenting evidence. For example, in New
York, salesmen of brushes for an organization operating
on a nationwide scale were held to be employees.19 The
marshalling and presentation of evidence required several
months of intensive work. It was only through the testi-
mony of persons who had severed their relationship with
the employer that all the facts were placed in the
record. Over one thousand pages of testimony were taken.
Evidence of direction and control was so complete that the
employer accepted the decision of the Appeal Board with-
out further appeal. In New Jersey, a court similarly held
the brush salesmen to be employees.2" In Utah, however,
the appellate court held the salesmen of the same organiza-
tion to be independent persons."'
Although the Utah decision has been criticized severely
for its interpretation of the "ABC" provisions of the Utah
statute, it could be argued that an exhaustive investigation
would have produced a record, as it did in New York and
New Jersey, which would have induced a finding of an
employee-employer relationship under any test.2 One writer
19 New York Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board 6,080 (1941).2 0 Shomp v. Fuller Brush Co., 124 N.J.L. 487, 12 A.2d 702 (1940), aff'd,
126 N.J.L. 368, 19 A.2d 780 (1941).
21 Fuller Brush Co. v. Industrial Comnn'n, 99 Utah 97, 104 P.2d 201
(1940).22Asia, Employment Relations: Contnon-Law Concept and Legislative
Definition, 55 YALE L.J. 76 (1945). It should be noted that although the
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on the problem has pointed out that "the list of conflicting
decisions is too long and the factual similarities are too
great to permit the decisions to be harmonized . 23
Even in a single jurisdiction it is sometimes difficult
to reconcile opposite decisions in cases strikingly similar
on their facts. In 1940 in Matter of Morton," the New
York Court of Appeals held that corsetieres were employees
and not independent persons. Two years later, in Matter
of NuBone Co. 2 5 the same Court, without opinion, affirmed
a holding that corsetieres who worked under similar cir-
cumstances were independent persons. The distinguishing
factor may have been that the earlier case concerned a
claim for benefits while the latter case involved an assess-
ment for contributions.
It is of interest to examine the application of the
common-law rule of master and servant to particular cases.
Several occupational categories have recurrently received
judicial attention.
Commission ,Salesmen
In order to determine whether a commission salesman
is an employee or an independent person, it is necessary,
as in all unemployment insurance coverage cases, to ex-
amine carefully the acts of the parties and their conduct
during the period of the relationship. The elements of
direction and control present in any given situation depend,
of course, on the nature of the business and on the facts
and circumstances surrounding the relationship.
If the contract under which the services are performed
vests in the employer the right of direction and control,
an employee-employer relationship is deemed to have been
statutes of New Jersey and Utah provided for the "ABC" tests, in both
instances the court required the establishment of the common-law relation-
ship of master and servant before the "ABC" tests became applicable.
23 Wilcox, The Coverage of Untemployment Compensation Laws, 8
VAtD. L. Rav. 245, 250 (1955). See also Teple, The Employer-Employee
Relationship, 10 OHio ST. L.J. 153 (1949).
24284 N.Y. 167, 30 N.E2d 369 (1940).
25287 N.Y. 716, 39 N.E2d 933 (1942).
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created, and the fact that the employer may not have
exercised the right is considered to be immaterial. If, on
the other hand, the contract attempts to establish an
independent contractor status for the commission salesman,
the contract is not binding upon the administrator nor the
adjudicator. The agency may, by other evidence, establish
the true relationship of the parties.26
The relationship must be examined in greatest detail;
all elements which bespeak direction or control must be
marshalled and placed in the record. Some of the elements
which tend to show the presence or absence of direction
and control are as follows:
1. The nature of the application for the position.
2. Whether the employer must approve orders.
3. Whether the commission salesman has a choice of
placing business either with the employer or others.
4. Whether the salesman is required to collect accounts
and is required to guarantee credit of customers.
5. Whether the employer establishes a sales quota.
6. Whether the salesman is required to carry a pub-
lic liability policy in favor of the employer.
7. Whether the salesman is required to attend a train-
ing course or take training from time to time.
8. Whether the salesman is required to supply a fidelity
bond for the faithful performance of his duties.
9. Whether the employer furnishes leads to the sales-
man.
10. Whether the list of customers whom the salesman
services is the property of the salesman or the em-
ployer.
11. Whether the salesman is required to report to the
employer.
12. Whether the salesman is required to attend meet-
ings.
13. Whether the employer fixes the price of the merchan-
dise to be offered for sale.
26 Matter of Morton, 284 N.Y. 167, 30 N.E.2d 369 (1940).
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14. Whether the salesman or the employer fixes the
credit terms.
15. Whether or not the salesman enjoys Workmen's
Compensation Insurance coverage.
16. Whether or not the salesman is afforded fringe
benefits such as vacation pay, hospital, medical and
other group insurance furnished to admitted em-
ployees.
17. Whether or not the employer makes income tax
withholding deductions.
18. Whether the salesman is required to train other
personnel.
19. Whether or not the salesman is required to work
in conjunction with salaried employees in connection
with his various duties.
20. Whether business cards and forms are furnished
by the employer to the salesman.
21. Whether the employer furnishes sales literature and
samples.
22. Whether or not the employer censors correspondence
written by the salesman.
23. Whether travel, entertainment and similar expenses
are borne by the salesman or the employer.
24. Whether the salesman is given a fixed territory or
can sell wherever he chooses.
25. Whether the salesman is permitted to carry other
products, especially competitive products.
26. Whether the employer has the right to hire and
fire the salesman.
27. Whether the salesman receives a fixed wage, drawing
account or advances against future commissions.
28. In states where an unorganized business tax is im-
posed the payment or non-payment of such tax is
material. Only persons in business are required to
pay such tax. In such states the relationship of
employee-employer is advantageous not only for un-
employment compensation benefits but also to avoid
tax burdens. The unincorporated business tax in
New York State and the gross receipts tax in New
[ VOL.. 42
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York City have been potent factors in convincing
many whose status was not clear that they were
employees rather than independent contractors.
The fact that the Social Security tax rate for self-
employed persons is higher than that imposed upon
wage earners may also be persuasive.
Great importance has been placed by the courts on
whether the commission salesman was subject to summary
discharge, was required to devote fixed hours to his work,
and whether he received regular remuneration, a drawing
account or advances against commissions." All of the
elements of direction and control are then placed, so to
speak, in the judicial cauldron and from such brew a con-
clusion of law is distilled.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the common-law
test has conspicuously failed to achieve uniformity or cer-
tainty in its application. A writer on the subject observed:
The ultimate issue is whether enough control is vested in the
employer to meet an ill-defined standard; and in view of the
multiplicity of ways in which control or its absence may be evi-
denced, and the subtlety of the influences which in any continuing
relationship make for autonomy or for subservience, it is small
wonder that judges should differ widely in their appraisal of
similar situations.28
After 1969, many of the problems in this area may be
eliminated. Proposed amendments to the Federal Unem-
ployment Tax Act provide that certain commission sales-
men, routemen, traveling salesmen, and similar persons
are to be considered as employees under that Act even
though the common-law test of a master-servant relation-
ship is not met.29  Undoubtedly most states will conform
their statutes if the Federal Act is changed. In New York,
27 Matter of Keith, 262 App. Div. 984, 30 N.Y.S.2d 206 (3d Dep't 1941);
Matter of Binder, 259 App. Div. 1103, 21 N.Y.S.2d 369 (3d Dep't 1940);
Matter of Scatola v. Bronx Home News Pub. Co., 257 App. Div. 471, 14
N.Y.S.2d 55 (3d Dep't 1939).
28 WilcoC, supra note 23.
29 S. 2377, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
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legislation has already been drafted to adopt the proposed
federal definition.
Entertainers
The status of actors in legitimate shows, motion pic-
ture productions, and dramatic radio and television shows
usually does not present a coverage problem. The problem
arises in connection with variety artists, night club enter-
tainers and performers who have their own specialty acts.
In the first court decision on the subject in Ngew York,
the appellate division held that entertainers who per-
formed in a stage show at Radio City Music Hall were
not employees even though the management had the right
to approve' changes in the personnel of the acts, to pre-
scribe the number of shows to be performed, to order re-
visions in the script, and to vary the duration of perform-
ance time. These actors furnished their own equipment,
costumes and music. They were engaged through booking
agents and, unlike permanent personnel used by the theatre
in its stage shows, did not receive the benefit of Work-
men's Compensation, hospital or other group insurance
benefits. The court held that the actors who had their own
specialty acts were actually engaged in independent call-
ings and were not employees.3 0
Variety actors in night clubs were held to be independ-
ent persons anad not employees. 1 However, a bit actor in
a radio serial who was required to attend rehearsals, who
performed his services subject to the supervision of a di-
rector, who could be discharged at will or pursuant to
union agreement, and who received union scale wages was
held to be an employee.2
A hotel which did not furnish an integrated show
but hired several specialty acts which furnished their own
elaborate costumes, props and equipment was held not to
so Matter of Radio City Music Hall Corp., 262 App. Div. 593, 31 N.Y.S.2d
284 (3d Dep't 1941).3 1Matter of Lansdowne Service, Inc., 263 App. Div. 916, 32 N.Y.S.2d
175 (3d Dep't 1942).3 2 Matter of Velie, 294 N.Y. 725, 61 N.E2d 455 (1945).
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be the employer in spite of the fact that the specialty
actors were labeled as employees in their engagement
contracts.3
Employers are not alone in attempting by means of a
contract to color or mask a relationship. The unions or
guilds of which the specialty actors were members sought
to extend the benefits of the unemployment insurance pro-
gram to their members. These contracts, however, were not
drawn as ingeniously as the "Form B" contract of the
Musician's Union and the courts held that the use of such
contracts did not vest the purchaser of the act with the
right of direction and control but merely designated the
purchaser as an employer and the specialty actors as em-
ployees. These labels were held to be of no significance.
Since the contracts did not vest the employer with the right
of direction and control, they did not create an employee-
employer relationship. 4
Musicins
The strict application of the common-law master and
servant doctrine by the New York courts resulted in the
creation of anomalous situations in musician cases. The
issue in these cases is not whether the musicians are
employees, but whether their employer is the leader of the
orchestra or the purchaser of the music. Musicians who
are members of bands or orchestras are subjected to the
minutest type of direction and control. Without such di-
rection and control by the leader, the result would be dis-
cord and not harmony. The issue in such cases is whether
the leader exercises the control on his own behalf or as
an employee of the purchaser of the music.
Despite the economic realities of the situation, the
New York courts have held the purchaser of the music to
33 Matter of Realty Hotels, Inc., 285 App. Div. 917, 137 N.Y.S.2d 380
(3d Dep't 1955).
84 Matter of Versailles, 3 App. Div. 2d 789 (3d Dep't 1957); Matter of
Jamestown Lodge, 285 App. Div. 919, 137 N.Y.S2d 608 (3d Dep't 1955);
Matter of Valley Stream Park Inn, 285 App. Div. 920, 137 N.Y.S.2d: 522(3d Dep't 1955).
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be the employer of both the leader and musicians if the
parties entered into the standard union (American Feder-
ation of Musicians) musician's contract, 5 which provides
as follows:
If any employees have not been chosen upon the signing of this
contract, the leader shall, as agent for the employer and under his
instructions, hire such persons and any replacements as are re-
quired for persons who for any reason do not perform any or all
services. The employer shall at all times have complete control
over the services of employees under this contract, and the leader
shall, as agent of the employer, enforce disciplinary measures for
just cause, and carry out instructions as to selections and manner
of performance. . . . On behalf of the employer the leader will
distribute the amount received from the employer to the employees,
including himself, as indicated on the opposite side of this contract,
or in place thereof on separate memorandum supplied to the em-
ployer at or before the commencement of the employment here-
under and take and turn over to the employer receipts therefor
from each employee, including himself ...
In the absence of conclusive evidence to the contrary, this
contractual provision has been held by the New York courts
to create an employer-employee relationship between the
leader and the purchaser of the music. The leader is
deemed to be an employee of the purchaser of the music
and any direction and control which he exercises over
the musicians is done as agent of the purchaser of the music
and on his behalf. That the purchaser of the music may,
in fact, not exercise any control over the leader and the
musicians is legally immaterial; the contractual reservation
of the right of direction and control is almost always de-
cisive.
Unlike the Supreme Court of the United States in
Bartels v. Hirmngham,8 the New York courts have refused
to consider the economic realities of the situation. The
fact that the band was an organized unit and that the
35 Matter of Basin Street, 6 N.Y.2d 276, 160 N.F2d 517, 189 N.Y.S2d
640 (1959), reversing, 6 App. Div. 2d 922, 175 N.Y.S.2d 889 (3d Dep't
1958); Matter of American Legion, Inc., 10 App. Div. 2d 400, 199 N.Y.S.2d
1000 (3d Dep't 1960).
86332 U.S. 126 (1947).
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leader maintained a more or less permanently organized
group did not impress the New York tribunals, nor did
the fact that the leader maintained an office and hired
arrangers, office personnel, booking agents, band managers
and band boys and provided the music, transportation and
uniforms. By an application of an ancient doctrine and the
acceptance of a contractual fiction, the court found an
employer-employee relationship where, if viewed in the
light of economic reality, such relationship simply did not
exist.
The anomalous tax situation brought about by the
conflict between the state and federal decisions was ig-
nored by the New York courts. By virtue of the Bartels
case, the leader of a name band is deemed to be the em-
ployer and is liable for the entire tax under the Federal
Unemployment Insurance Tax Act. The New York agency
will not knowingly accept the payment of contributions by
the leader, as an employer; and the purchaser of the music,
who is not liable for taxes under the Federal Act, must
pay all contributions due on the earnings of the leader and
the members of the orchestra to New York State. No em-
ployer, therefore, receives credit under the Federal Unem-
ployment Insurance Tax Act for the payment of contribu-
tions to New York State.
The New York administration was faced with the un-
pleasant task of insisting upon the payment of contribu-
tions by the "father of the bride" who, on the occasion of
his daughter's wedding, signed a "Form B" contract in
order to obtain the services of an organized group of musi-
cians. However, this situation has now been remedied.
The union's new single engagement contract form provides
that the leader is deemed to be the employer of the musi-
cians and the purchaser is no longer, by virtue of such
contract, vested with the right of control.
The purchaser under a "Form B" contract will not be
relieved of the effects of the contract by establishing that he
did not in fact exercise direction and control, by urging
that it was a fiction, or by showing that if he did not ex-
ecute the form contract he would not have been able to
1968]
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obtain musicians. The burden of proof rests with the pur-
chaser to establish that the contract provision concerning
direction and control was in fact a fiction or induced by
fraud. In order to be successful he must show, for ex-
ample, that when he attempted to exercise control, such
control or direction was not accepted by the leader. A
rider to the agreement will relieve the purchaser of the
music of liability only if it expressly provides that he is
not vested with the right of direction and control over the
leader and revokes the appointment of the leader as his
agent.
Honeworkers
Industrial homeworkers in New York were held to be
employees for many years prior to the adoption of the
Unemployment Insurance Law. Thus, in cases involving
industrial homeworkers under the New York law, the
courts had little difficulty in applying these precedents
and in finding that the homeworkers were employees with-
in the meaning of the Unemployment Insurance Law.
Little attention was paid to the argument that since the
work was not performed in the employer's establishment
but in the worker's home, their work could not be con-
stantly supervised.
Curiously, the very court which held industrial home-
workers to be employees, held clerical homeworkers who
worked under similar circumstances to be independent
persons." However, in a later case the appellate division
came to the conclusion that a clerical homeworker, who
obtained her employment through a help-wanted advertise-
ment, was required to call upon the employer daily to
obtain and return work, was paid at a fixed rate on Friday
of each week, was responsible for spoilage, was required to
correct any errors which the employer discovered, and re-
ceived detailed instructions as to the manner in which she
37 Matter of United States Pencil Co., 268 App. Div. 842, 50 N.Y.S2d
337 (3d Dep't 1944).
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was to perform the work, was indeed an employee and
not an independent person."s
Truck Drivers
The owner-driver presents a problem which has facets
not often found in the usual master and servant cases.
The courts in New York have not hestitated to find a master
and servant relationship where common-law direction and
control is present even though the contract of hire requires
the driver to furnish a truck or tractor.39  The furnishing
of the truck has been compared to the furnishing of hand-
tools by carpenters or plumbers. The fact that the owner-
operator might work for other employers when his services
were not required by the employer in issue was held not
inconsistent with an employer-employee relationship."
As in other occupations, a contract of hire which
vested the employer with the right of direction and control
over the owner as the driver was held to create an em-
ployer-employee relationship. 1 Even where the contract
labeled the owner-driver an independent contractor, the
courts have looked beyond the contract and found that the
employer exercised sufficient direction and control to satisfy
the requirements of the common-law rules of master and
servant."
The New York Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board
had no difficulty in finding a school bus driver who fur-
nished his own station wagon to be an employee. The
Board there stated:
In certain occupations, it is not unusual to find that workmen
furnish their own tools and equipment. The fact, therefore, that
claimant furnished his own vehicle is not conclusive . ..
38 Matter of Sepe, 281 App. Div. 272, 121 N.Y.S.2d 58 (3d Dep't 1953).39 M atter of Gailey Coal Co., 263 App. Div. 1023, 33 N.Y.S.2d 511 (3d
Dep't 1942).
4 Carriere v. Syracuse Freight & Forwarding Co., 259 App. Div. 764, 18
N.Y.S.2d 750 (3d Dep't 1940).12Matter of Gailey Coal Co., 263 App. Div. 1023, 33 N.Y.S.2d 511 (3d
Dep't 1942).12 Matter of Petelin Dairy Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 828, 192 N.Y.S.2d 843
(3d Dep't 1959).
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The evidence fails to support the employer's contention that claim-
ant was an independent contractor. While claimant owned his
own station wagon, he did not hold himself out to the general
public as being in the school transportation business, nor did he
hold himself out to the general public as a taxi driver or as
engaged in any phase of the public transportation business. Claim-
ant had a job with the employer, nothing more. The fact that he
furnished his own vehicle did not, in and of itself, make claimant
an independent contractor.4 3
In truck driver cases an important element of control
is the employer's right to designate routes and to insist,
in the case of a public carrier, on strict adherence to the
rules of the supervising governmental agency. The em-
ployer's requirement that the driver wear a uniform with
the employer's name or trademark, make collections, issue
bills of lading, and handle products of the employer exclu-
sively are also important elements.
In those few cases where a truck driver or owner-
driver was held to be an independent contractor, the em-
ployer did not exercise direction and control and the con-
tract of hire did not vest the right of control in the em-
ployer.
Barbershop Chair Lessees
Whether a chair or booth lessee in a beauty salon or
barbershop is an employee or independent contractor de-
pends upon the rental agreement: is it a subterfuge to mask
the true relationship or a legitimate reflection of the status
of the person who rents the chair?
A chair lessee was held to be an employee where the
owner of the shop was present at all times and worked
alongside. The employer paid for advertising and business
cards, provided each operator with an appointment sheet
on which was kept a record of daily cash receipts, and
settled accounts with the barber daily. The employer
could cancel the so-called lease at any time and he fur-
nished light, heat and all supplies. The so-called written
lease under such circumstances was held to be a nullity and
43 New York Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board 127, 405 (1965).
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a subterfuge and the relationship between the parties was
found to be one of employer-employee."
However, in instances where the chair lessee was free
to come and go as he pleased, where he purchased his own
supplies, arranged his own appointments with customers,
fixed his own service fees and had established credit with
supply houses, the barber was held to be in an independent-
ly established business and not an employee. 5
Professional Persons
Many decisions have considered the status of attorneys,
doctors, nurses, engineers and architects. 6 The common-
law control test was applied to these cases in the same
fashion as in other occupations. Where the right to direct
and control was established, the professional man was held
to be an employee. The cases, however, are often difficult
due to the absence of supervision and direction because
of the competence of the professional and the fact that his
independent judgment is frequently the service for which
the employer has contracted.
A referee's decision recently dealt with the status of
doctors who worked for a physician and held that in one
aspect of the relationship the doctors were employees and
in another that they were independent contractors. The
employee relationship was found to exist when the doctors
worked in the employer's office subject to his overall super-
vision. Where they voluntarily accepted assignments from
the employer outside his office and were free of all con-
trol, they were not employees."
CONCLUSION
The common-law control test is sometimes difficult to
apply and it may not furnish the absolute certainty and
44 Matter of Scolamerio, 262 App. Div. 1053, 30 N.Y.S.2d 363 (3d Dep't
1941).
45 New York Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board 9065 (1943).
-16 Renouf v. New York Cent. R.R., 229 App. Div. 58, 240 N.Y.S. 720
(3d Dep't), rev'd, 254 N.Y. 349, 173 N.E. 218 (1930).
47 New York Unemployment Insurance Referee's Decision, Case E-519-64
(1964).
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guidelines welcomed by the administrator. However, after
thirty years of decisions in New York, the administrators
and adjudicators under the unemployment insurance pro-
gram are satisfied that they have evolved an arrangement
which works. The definitions, standards and precedents
now cover the overwhelming majority of situations and the
areas of doubt are constantly narrowed. There is no clam-
or in New York for the adoption of the "AB.C" tests and
no prospect of the enactment of such legislation.
